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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
furnish the rule most likely to prevent, in his words, the reduc-
tion of "the law of custody to a rule of seize-and-run.'1 2
Helen M. Wimmer
CONFLICT OF LAWS-JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENTS-
CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE IN TORT ACTION ARISING
OUTSIDE THE STATE
Suit in New York arose out of a death resulting from the
crash of an airliner operated by defendant corporation. A New
York statute provided that service of process could be made upon
the Secretary of State as agent for nonresident owners of air-
craft for the purposes of litigation arising out of accidents of
any aircraft "which has landed at or departed from any airfield
in this state."' The airliner was on a scheduled flight from
New York to California and crashed in California. Defendant
was served with process in New York in accordance with the
statute. The application of the statute under these facts was
challenged as a violation of due process. The lower court ruled
that all the requirements were met.2 On appeal, held, the statute
was unconstitutional insofar as it was applied to accidents or
collisions which occurred out of state, as the police power of the
state may not be projected -beyond its territorial boundaries.
Peters v. Robin Airlines, 281 App. Div. 903, 120 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d
Dep't 1953).
The United States Supreme Court in 1878 in the landmark
case of Pennoyer v. Neff' held that constructive service upon a
nonresident defendant is ineffective to support a personal judg-
ment. The court limited the decision by expressly excluding any
opinion as to the right of states to require the appointment of
agents for service of process by nonresidents "entering into a
partnership or association within its limits" for actions arising
out of such business.4 Nevertheless, that case represents the high
water mark in protecting nonresident defendants. The principles
of Pennoyer v. Neff have by necessity undergone modifications.
It has long been well settled that nonresident corporations
doing business within a state are subject to the jurisdiction of its
12. 345 U.S. 528, 542 (1953).
1. N.Y. GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 250 (Cum. Supp. 1952).
2. Peters v. Robin Airlines, 118 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
4. Id. at 735.
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courts.5 The reasoning employed was that since a state could
exclude corporations from entering the state, it could impose
conditions on their doing business." But this reasoning could not
be applied to individuals because of the "privileges and immuni-
ties" clause of the Federal Constitution. Hence, in 1918 in the
case of Flexner v. Farson,7 the United States Supreme Court held
that the mere doing of business in the state by a nonresident indi-
vidual could not be held to imply consent to service of process.
In reply to the constitutional obstacle of "privileges and immuni-
ties," the states have retaliated with the equally powerful tool
of "police power." In Doherty & Co. v. Goodman8 the Supreme
Court found a reasonable exercise of police power in a state
statute making the conduct of the business of selling securities
the basis of jurisdiction. However, since all sales of securities in
the state were subjected to special regulations, the case is not
authority for saying that the carrying on of an ordinary business
by an individual may be the basis of jurisdiction. While the rule
of the Flexner case has not been squarely presented to the
Supreme Court for reconsideration, state courts have upheld
statutes which provide that a nonresident individual doing busi-
ness within the state need not be served personally, but could
be served through his agent even if the latter was not specifically
appointed to receive process.9
In Supreme Court cases prior to Doherty & Co. v. Goodman'0
the proposition that the police power of the state to regulate
dangerous acts includes the power to require submission by the
actor to its jurisdiction had included only acts which were
physically dangerous to citizens of the state. In Hess v. Pawloski"
the Supreme Court upheld a statute which permitted service of
process on a nonresident by service on the Secretary of State for
any cause of action arising out of an automobile accident within
5. People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918);
Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93
(1917); St. Louis S.W.R.R. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); Lafayette Ins.
Co. v. French, Strong and Fine, 18 How. 404 (U.S. 1856).
6. See cases cited note 5 supra.
7. 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
8. 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
9. See, e.g., Wein v. Crockett, 195 P.2d 222 (Utah 1948).
10. 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
11. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). In Louisiana, LA. R.S. § 13:3474 et 8eq. (1950)
permits suit against a nonresident by service on the Secretary of State for
causes arising out of automobile accidents within the state in which the non-
resident is involved. The constitutionality of the statute was upheld in
Moore v.,Payne, 35 F.2d 232 (W.D. La. 1929). See also Roper v. Brooks, 201
La. 135, 9 So.2d 485 (1942); Galloway v. Wyatt Metal & Boiler Works, 189 La.
837, 181 So. 187 (1938); Note, 1 LOUISANA LAW REviEw 451 (1939).
19541
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the state. The Doherty case extended such rules to include activi-
ties endangering economic interests of the public.12 A valid argu-
ment could be made that every business subjects the public to
economic dangers. The constitutional limits on police power of
the state in this area seem indefinite, to say the least.
As stated earlier, where nonresident corporations are con-
cerned, the authority of the state to impose conditions on the
"doing of business" is well established. 13 It is thus understand-
able that the meaning of "doing business" as that phrase is used
in nonresident corporation statutes has troubled the courts for
many years.' 4 However, the speculation about its meaning was
reduced by the Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington. In that case, the court introduced new cri-
teria for determining what activity by a corporation within a
state subjects it to the jurisdiction of the courts of that state
through the medium of substituted service. Instead of a showing
that a corporation was "doing business" within a state, under the
holding of the International Shoe Co. case, the demands of due
process "may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the
state of the forum as make it reasonable" for a state court to take
jurisdiction.
In the cases discussed above, the causes of action arose in
the state of the forum. For actions arising without the state,
new complications arise. In 1907 in the case of Old Wayne Mutual
Life Association v. McDonough" the Supreme Court held that a
state statute providing for substituted service on foreign corpora-
tions was not applicable in causes of action arising outside the
state. This apparently sweeping rule was later restricted to cases
in which service is made on a public official; suit was permitted
on out of state causes where service was made on an appointed
agent.' 7
The recent case of Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co.' 8
involved a suit on a cause of action arising outside the state of
Ohio, where suit was brought. The defendant corporation was a
"sociedad anonima" incorporated under the laws of the Philip-
12. Of., e.g., Recent Cases, 48 HARV. L. Rsv. 1433 (1935).
13. See cases cited note 5 supra.
14. Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 COL. L. REv. 1018 (1925).
15. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
16. 204 U.S. 8 (1907).
17. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243
U.S. 93 (1917); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915
(1917).
18. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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pine Islands, owning gold and silver mines there. During the
Japanese occupation of the Philippines the president of the cor-
poration returned to his home in Ohio, where "he maintained an
office in which he conducted his own affairs and did many things
on behalf of the company," which are enumerated in the opinion. 19
The United States Supreme Court found that the Ohio courts
could in this case, without violating federal due process, exercise
or decline jurisdiction over the foreign corporation since personal
service had been made on its president. There being personal
service upon an officer of the corporation, the Court specifically
distinguished the holding of the Old Wayne case, where service
had been made upon a public official without actual notice having
been received by a responsible representative of the foreign
corporation.20
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has not had
occasion to rule on a case involving an out-of-state cause of action
where substituted service is made under a so-called "dangerous
activity" type of statute. The cases discussed above involved
statutes which depend upon the "doing business" theory or the
modification of that theory under the International Shoe Co. doc-
trine. The lower court in the instant case applied the Inter-
national Shoe Co. rule, holding that the requirements set forth
in that case were met by the statute requiring sufficient contacts
by the defendant within the state, to-wit, landing or taking off
of its airplanes. 21 The Appellate Division reversed this decision,
reasoning that the statute was a police power measure and not
a "doing business" statute (requiring sufficient contacts within
the state) and hence the court did not even refer to the Inter-
national Shoe Co. doctrine. It is submitted, however, that had
the service of process been made under a nonresident "doing
business" or "sufficient contact" type of statute, the upholding
of the lower court's decision would be inconsistent with the rule
of the Old Wayne case because service had been made upon a
public official and not upon an appointed agent or officer of the
corporation.
In examining the problem of judicial jurisdiction historically
since Pennoyer v. Neff,22 it is clear that the trends have been
away from the extreme position taken in that case and toward
19. Id. at 448.
20. Id. at 443-4.
21. 118 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1952).
22. See note 3 supra.
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abolition of technical rules which give an undue advantage to
nonresident defendants. 28 The plaintiff is being relieved of some
of the inconveniences entailed by rules designed when business
methods and transportation facilities were very different from
what they are today. The decision in the International Shoe Co.
case emphasizes the reasonableness test in determining whether
a defendant is in fact being dealt with fairly. While it is sub-
mitted that the instant case was decided properly under present
concepts of jurisdictional requirements, if we pursue the reason-
ableness notion, the case seems to indicate that these concepts
are still in need of modification. Assuming proper notice and
sufficient time to defend, could a valid argument be made that
it would be unreasonable or unfair to require the defendant air-
line corporation to submit to suit in New York where it con-
ducted business, where the plaintiff boarded the plane, and where
he was domiciled? Is it realistic to place so much significance on
the actual place of the injury? The problem when viewed in its
entirety presents two sets of competing interests: first, those of
the nonresident defendant who, because he had dealings outside
his home state, may be put to great inconveniences in defending
a suit there since even if the plaintiff has no cause for institut-
ing action, still a defense must be made; second, those of the
plaintiff who may be deprived of a real opportunity to enforce
his rights if he is forced to bring his suit in a distant jurisdic-
tion.24 What difference should it make that the injury occurred in
another state? Whether the problem be approached by defining
the limits of police power or by determining what constitutes the
doing of business, it would seem that principles of reasonableness
and fairness should be paramount to technical niceties, many of
which may be obsolete. Where the line should be drawn in
balancing the inconveniences between plaintiffs and nonresident
defendants is a question of great importance which should be
dealt with by legislation or jurisprudence in the light of modern
business and commercial trends.
Harold J. Brouillette
23. Note, Conflict of Laws-Apparent Trends in Jurisdiction, 34 Ky. L.J.
139 (1945).
24. For an excellent discussion of the dual trend in jurisdictional deci-
sions, see Note, The Growth of the International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. OF CHL
L. R v. 523, 536 (1949).
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